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Abstract 
 From the Battle for the Ia-Drang Valley in 1965 to the final withdrawal from the 
American Embassy in Saigon in 1975, the helicopter was an integral part of American forces 
strategy in the Vietnam War. The focus of this study is to view the helicopter as a tool of 
military strategy, more than a piece of hardware. My thesis is that the helicopter enabled the 
search-and-destroy war waged by American forces against the North Vietnamese forces. This 
is part of the overarching theme which we see developing in American military history 
during the post-WWII era: an over reliance on technology to wage wars, often to the neglect 
of strategy. This article details the adoption of the helicopter by the US Army, explores how 
air-mobility played a role in the Vietnam War, and ultimately offers perspective on the 
relationship between technology and strategy in the modern era.  
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 In Saigon, 1974, South Vietnamese nationals and their families crowded around the 
embassy, struggling to be on one of the last American helicopters out of South Vietnam. With 
the withdrawal of American military support in early 1973, Saigon had fallen to the 
Communist North Vietnamese forces, and anyone who had supported the South Vietnamese 
or the Americans were desperately fleeing the capital city. The Vietnam War forever changed 
American perspective on war, protest, the military, and government. Prior to Vietnam, 
America had never - in the public perception - lost a war.  The American withdrawal from the 
Vietnamese theater is forever etched into the collective memory of the American citizenry, 
government, and military. 
 Technology played a pivotal role in the War, more so than in previous conflicts. In the 
post WWII era, the United States emerged as a global superpower capable of sustaining a 
massive military-industrial complex. This force was necessary to wage the large-scale force-
on-force conflict that it fought in WWII and in Korea, and that it was prepared to fight 
against the Soviet Union. Vietnam was the first truly-unconventional war in which the US 
was engaged, being fought against enemy combatants who intermixed themselves with the 
population and did not wear uniforms. As a result, the US had a massive technological 
superiority over the enemy who did not have the military-infrastructure of a large state like 
the Soviet Union or the Axis Powers had. However, this has led to the US being reliant upon 
its technological superiority in order to win battles. This trend began in Vietnam, as the US 
still relied on its domestic manufacturing capability as it had during the previous conflicts, 
and has continued to this day. Currently, the study of the impact of technology on warfare 
centers around current events and recently developed technology: drones, satellites, and 
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surveillance technology. This is the result of the last fifteen years of continuous war in the 
Middle East, which has inarguably been a catalyst to the development of military technology 
as a whole. The vast majority of the study on the technology in Vietnam exists in academic 
writing was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The helicopter was integral to the tactical, operational and strategic level operations 
in the fight against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces. The US’ reliance on 
the helicopter in Vietnam is but one example of the general trend of the military’s over 
reliance on technology in warfare. The more recent literature is not mired in the Cold War 
atmosphere which deeply colored discussions of the Vietnam War. Most modern study of the 
helicopter is found in compilation works centering around American military history, 
technology, or Vietnam; but there have been few recent works addressing the helicopter 
specifically as it facilitated the campaign strategy in Vietnam. The focus of this study is to 
view the helicopter as a tool of military strategy, more than a piece of hardware.   
 Powered flight of any kind was unattainable and impractical until the development of 
gasoline powered engines in the early 20th century. Many inventors, such as Thomas Edison, 
had attempted to construct a helicopter.  Even the Wright brothers tried – although they gave 
up after deciding the concept had “no future.”  While there were practical models which 1
preceded it, the XR-4 was the first truly practical helicopter built in the United States- its first 
contract being awarded to Sikorsky in 1942.  The development of the helicopter continued 2
throughout the Second World War, and helicopters were employed by both the Axis and the 
! Ralph P. Alex, How Are You For Fixed Blades?, in Vertical Flight, ed. Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez 1
(Smithsonian Institute: Washington D.C., 1984), 22. 
Ibid. 2
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Allies, although not on any large scale. The Vietnam War was the first war in which the 
helicopter was utilized as a transport vehicle for soldiers in large numbers or in an offensive 
capacity. The only significant use of the helicopter prior was the use of the Bell-47 as a 
medical-evacuation vehicle in the Korean conflict during the 1950s, made famous by its 
appearance during the opening credits of the popular sitcom M*A*S*H*.  The historical 3
question is whether the availability of the air-mobility in the Vietnam War drove the strategy, 
or if the strategy drove the demand for new technology. I believe that the availability of the 
helicopter enabled the overarching strategy of attrition which the US Army waged against 
NVA and FLA forces in Vietnam.   4
 However, the helicopter was not the deciding factor in the strategic choices in 
Vietnam. Air-mobility was not central to the strategy which the President and his Defense 
Department eventually pursued, but came as a result of it, as the strategic/political level 
planners make decisions that more often have indirect impacts on the battle space. The 
helicopter was a vital part of the American strategy at the operational level, and aided 
battlefield commanders in launching operations that would have otherwise required roads, or 
foot insertions into areas unreachable by wheeled or tracked vehicles. The availability of the 
helicopter allowed the Army to pursue its overarching strategy of attrition in Vietnam, by 
making it easier to maintain contact with the enemy. In the context of Pentagon politics, the 
helicopter was important for the Army to control more of the battle space than it would have 
had it not developed it’s own organic airpower. The helicopter had significant effects on the 
Popular CBS sit-com which ran from 1972-1983, featuring the antics of the doctors and nurses of the 4077th 3
Medical Army Surgical Hospital in Korea. 
The NVA is an abbreviation for the North Vietnamese Army, and FLA, or Freedom Liberation Army, here after 4
will be referred to as the Viet Cong, or VC. 
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decisions made by military commanders in Vietnam, as it opened up the possibility of 
entirely new operations and forever changed the landscape of the modern battlefield.  
 The widespread use of and reliance on the helicopter by American forces is indicative 
of a much broader theme: the over reliance on technology by the American military. This 
being such a broad theme in American military history, the scope of this paper is limited to 
the Army’s adoption and use of the helicopter in Vietnam, and the Army’s ground war in 
Vietnam.  
 The primary sources principally stem from official US Army documents, such as the 
findings of the Howze Tactical Mobility Board.  The Howze Board was an official inquiry 5
set into motion by the Pentagon in 1962, in order to determine the viability—financially, 
logistically and practically—of creating an air-mobile force borne into battle by helicopters. 
Official documents allow a high-level perspective behind the “Big-Army’s” thought process 
in selecting and applying the helicopter in their theater strategy in Vietnam. Other primary 
sources range from personal memoirs of General Westmoreland, commander of US Military 
Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, as well as other soldiers and 
pilots who had company grade experiences during the War.  
 The secondary sources draw extensively from the large body of research and study 
conducted immediately following the war during the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the 
study on the Vietnam War took place. More recent scholarly studies have taken place, 
although most of the study on the helicopter are smaller sections of larger compilations. The 
majority of the secondary analysis is done by political scientists, historians and foreign policy 
US Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: Final Report, August 20, 1962. 5
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experts. Experts hailing from these fields bring a diverse set of biases and perspectives to the 
study, though they tend to fall into two distinct categories. Contemporaries of General 
Westmoreland and high-level planners tend to take defensive postures of the war strategy, as 
they all had hands in its execution and planning. Political scientists, scholars and most others 
are highly critical of the war strategy and the campaign goals of the war as a whole; this 
group is in the majority.  
 The Vietnam War was America’s first “modern” war, with all the recognizable 
elements which Americans today— now accustomed to watching combat footage in their 
living rooms—recognize as elements of modern warfare: armored vehicles, automatic 
weapons, combat fatigues, and now helicopters. The helicopter was as integral to America’s 
first battle in Vietnam, in the Ia Drang Valley, as it was in evacuating the final Americans 
from Saigon in 1975. The helicopter was the only vehicle which could have successfully 
inserted troops into remote clearings in the jungles of Vietnam, and the only vehicle capable 
of facilitating the strategy of attrition so successfully. The American military’s reliance on the 
helicopter was symptomatic of the broader reliance on technological superiority over the 
enemy. Within the context of the Army and a ground-war, this means the reliance on fire-
support from the air and fire-support from artillery pieces.  
Politics and War 
 At the onset of any military operation, there is a mission statement. A mission 
statement simply contains the “who, what, where, when, and the why” of the mission. A good 
mission statement is concise, contains a task and purpose, and gives clear guidance and 
direction to the organization. At the tactical and operational levels of the military, these 
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mission statements are written by commanders. At the national and strategic levels, missions 
are dictated by the civilian- political leadership. War is an extension of foreign policy, a tool 
for projecting will and power, and not an end unto itself (hopefully). During the Vietnam 
War, the goals of the political leadership were unclear, and unrealistic. The end state was to 
prevent the spread of communism, but how would this be measured? Was success in Vietnam 
a free and democratic South Vietnam, or was it just a South Vietnam who could keep the 
North in check? The ambiguous political goals of the war were, ultimately, what led to its 
failure. 
 The War in Vietnam was an extension of the Truman Doctrine, a post WW-II 
initiative planned by American diplomat George Kennan, that equated to a zero-tolerance 
policy for the spread of communism outside of countries already part of the communist bloc.  6
Even in its own time, the Truman Doctrine—synonymous with the containment strategy—
was criticized for not differentiating between nations of vital importance and those peripheral 
states whose political bent had little effect on the global balance of power between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The fatal flaw of the doctrine, which treated a communist 
revolution in Cuba the same as it would in Britain, is what brought the US military to wage 
war against an elusive enemy, halfway across the world, for nearly a decade.  
 Prior to the American intervention in the early 1960s, Vietnam had been a French 
colony. There was Vietnamese resistance to the French Colonial power in the region, which 
was partially manifested as the Communist-Nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh.  
After nearly 80 years of colonization, the Vietnamese forces defeated the French at the 
Office of the Historian, “Kennan and Containment, 1947,” MILESTONES: 1945–1952, accessed May 16, 6
2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan. 
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infamous siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. After the withdrawal of the French in 1954, 
Vietnam was divided politically into the communist North, whose capital was Hanoi, and the 
democratic South, whose capitol was Saigon. When the communist state formed in the North, 
the United States became concerned that instability may take hold in Southeast Asia, and that 
a domino effect would cause communism to spread across the region.  
 The political goals for Vietnam were laid out by President Johnson in his address to 
the American people on April 7, 1965. In this television address, Johnson addressed the 
growing unpopularity of Operation Rolling Thunder, the codename given to the Air Force’s 
bombing campaign over North Vietnam. President Johnson told the American people that we 
were in South Vietnam to “keep the promise” that we had made to protect its independence 
since the end of the Franco-Indochina War in 1954.  In the speech, he lists several more 7
reasons for our involvement, including a fear of the “domino effect” of communism 
spreading throughout Southeast Asia, starting with the fall of South Vietnam. President 
Johnson states that “our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom 
from attack.”  The below excerpt from the speech is somewhat ironic considering the level of 8
US military involvement which would take place in Vietnam during the next 10 years.  
Such peace[ful settlement] demands an independent South Vietnam -- securely 
guaranteed and able to shape its own relationship to all others -- free from 
outside interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other 
country. 
These are the essentials of any final settlement.  9
Lyndon B. Johnson, “American Policy in Vietnam” (speech, Washington D.C., April 7, 1965), American 7
Experience PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/psources/ps_policy.html.
Johnson, “American Policy in Vietnam.”8
Ibid. 9
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It is not a difficult parallel to draw between the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  
 Both conflicts were characterized by a large, technologically advanced state invading 
a technologically inferior state. In Vietnam, the NVA and VC never won in a force-on-force 
conflict, and after the 1968 Tet Offensive they avoided such battles with US forces 
completely. As General Westmoreland acknowledges in his memoir, A Soldier Reports, “in 
the face of American airpower, helicopter mobility, and fire support, there was no way Giap 
(commander of the NVA) could win on the battlefield.”  Similarly,  in Afghanistan the 10
Soviets were unable to overtake the Mujahideen, who waged a guerrilla campaign and forced 
a Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Mujahideen were funded in part by the US: just as the 
Soviets had funded the Communist North during the US-Vietnam war. In Afghanistan, as in 
Vietnam, technology alone was not enough to secure victory.  
 The Vietnam War was the proving ground for the concept of air-mobility and its 
potential was fully realized by the end of the conflict. Vietnam’s most lasting legacy, as far as 
the US Army is concerned, is the application of the airmobile concept and the helicopter. The 
ability to place soldiers in the field at nearly any given point on the map greatly expanded the 
options open to battlefield commanders, and proved to be particularly useful when fighting 
an enemy that refused to be static. North Vietnamese forces waged a guerrilla war against the 
large, comparatively cumbersome American forces who relied largely on their technological 
advantage. To characterize the war succinctly as a war of attrition, or as an anti-insurgency, 
does not do justice to the complexity of the conflict and is—to an extent—a simplification 
William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Da Capo Press, 1976), 405. 10
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used by historians to describe Vietnam.  These characterizations may be true for certain 11
campaigns, or for periods of the war, but it is important to note that there were significant 
military initiatives that were more comprehensive, and conducted outreach programs to the 
populace.  
Interservice Conflict and the Cold War Army 
 Before we can discuss how the helicopter was so influential on the American strategy 
in Vietnam, it is important to understand why the helicopter was adopted in the first place. 
Additionally, it’s important to understand why the Army—whose primary area of 
responsibility within the Department of Defense family is to conduct unified-land-operations
—by and large was the service that fielded the largest number of helicopters in Vietnam. The 
helicopter’s ability to fill a wide range of roles— enabled by its ability to land without an air 
strip and hovering capabilities— made it ideal for operations in the rice-paddies, jungles and 
villages of Vietnam. However, in order for the Army to field the helicopter it had several 
political battles to face.  
 The Cold War Army was forced to fight for resources, combat-roles and funding with 
its sister service the Air Force. The interservice rivalry and power struggle with the Air Force 
made the Army’s decision to adopt the helicopter a matter of politics as well as practicality, 
as the acquisition would expand the Army’s role on the battlefield, as well as its budget. The 
prospect of having an organic aircraft which could minimize the Air Force’s role in the 
Army’s ground war, combined with the practicality of the machine itself, made the helicopter
—and air mobility— the path forward for the Cold War Army. The conflict stems from their 
Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford 11
University Press, 2015). 
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separate roles, and cultures which began forming when the Army first acquired powered 
aircraft in the early 20th century, and culminated in the creation of a separate Air Force 
entirely following WWII.  
 The Air Force was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which split the Army 
Air Forces (AAF) from the Army, creating the Air Force as a separate branch of the military. 
There had been political pressure for an autonomous Air Force since the formation of the 
predecessor to the AAF the Army Air Corps (1926-1941), especially as the missions of many 
aircraft no longer had any direct support role for the Army’s ground forces.  The National 12
Defense Act granted the AAF the autonomy it had wanted, however the Army retained a 
small fleet of fixed-wing aircraft for troop-transport and close air-support, while the Air 
Force took over the strategic-bombing, heavy transport, and air-superiority roles.  
 These roles were established in negotiations within the Department of Defense that 
were conducted in Key West, Florida, in 1948.  The final output of this conference was the 13
document entitled “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” which 
delineated the roles of the separate services.  The Army was authorized only whatever 14
aviation assets were considered “organic.”  The Air Force, aside from the primary air-15
superiority role, was to “furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, 
including air lift, support and resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical 
reconnaissance, and the interdiction of enemy land and communications.”  The Army lost 16
US Army, “Army Air Corps,” accessed May 18, 2016, https://www.army.mil/aviation/aircorps. 12
Ibid. 13
US Defense Department, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1948, http://14
cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/729.
Ibid. 15
Ibid, section IV. 16
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control over the AAF completely, and was left with a fleet of fixed-wing aircraft used mostly 
for observation and directing field artillery. The Key West conference put the Air Force on 
equal footing bureaucratically with the Army, and left the Army in a position without many 
organic air-assets until they seized upon the helicopter as their primary air transport.  
 Dr. Ian Horwood, a military historian published by the Combat Studies Institute in 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, discusses the interservice conflict between the Army and the Air 
Force in his book, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War.  Horwood posits 17
that the Army seized upon the airmobile concept—and the acquisition of the helicopters 
required for the airmobile concept—as a means of retaining resources and authority within 
the Department of Defense.  Additionally, the Air Force was focused on its bombing 18
campaign in North Vietnam, and had little interest in supporting the Army’s ground campaign 
through providing significant close air support or light tactical transport. What air-assets were 
available were difficult to coordinate, and therefore many times late to engagements which 
often lasted only several minutes.  The Air Force did retrofit C-47 cargo planes for close air 
support by fitting them with Gatling-guns, but the amount of “spooky” aircraft (as they were 
nicknamed) was not enough to fully support the Army’s ground mission.  These roles were 19
instead taken upon by the helicopter, which the Army used to fill the role which the Air Force 
was unable or—more likely—unwilling to fill as it focused its own resources on developing 
its bombing campaign in North Vietnam.  20
Ian Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 17
Institute Press, 2006). 
Ibid, 89. 18
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 279. 19
Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War, 89. 20
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 Horwood and many other scholars attribute the Army’s quick adoption of the 
helicopter as a means of regaining its former air-transport and support role from the Air Force 
in a move driven by Pentagon politics. Morton Halperin, a foreign policy expert who served 
on the Department of Defense during the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War, has 
argued that the helicopter was adopted in order to fill the close air-support role assigned to an 
Air Force which did not field any such aircraft to fill the role.  In his article entitled “The 21
Key West Key,” authored in partnership with his son David Halperin in 1983, Halperin 
asserts that the helicopter’s vulnerability to ground fire, cost, and high volume of losses made 
it less effective than fixed-wing aircraft.  He cites that nearly one-third of the helicopters in 22
the fleet were lost over the course of the War as the primary evidence of its ineffectiveness.  23
Halperin believes that the helicopter was in place due almost solely to the interservice 
politics inside the Pentagon.  
 Undoubtedly, the prospect of regaining the air-support and some transport role 
heavily influenced the Army’s adoption of the helicopter. Within the Pentagon, the services’ 
bureaucracies exist in a state of anarchy in which they are constantly struggling in a zero-sum 
game for funding. Halperin also asserts that the helicopter’s many roles would have been 
better filled by fixed-wing aircraft. Fortunately for the US Army, Halperin had no hand in 
decisions of military strategy. The helicopter, by all accounts but Halperin’s, was an 
invaluable tool in the war in its roles as an attack, support and transport aircraft. Its ability to 
fly only hundreds of feet off the ground, hover, and take off in limited terrain, made it able to 
Morton and David Halperin,“The Key West Key,” Foreign Policy, No. 53 (1983): 114-130, http://21
www.jstor.org/stable/1148563, 119. 
Ibid, 120. 22
Ibid, 115. 23
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provide air-mobility into restrictive terrain that would have been impenetrable to fixed-wing 
aircraft, which always require a landing strip to land and take off from. Indeed, the helicopter 
is the only aircraft which could have transported soldiers into the swamps of the Mekong 
Valley, the highlands, and the dense jungles. As I will discuss in subsequent sections, the 
helicopter was vital to the Battle for the Ia Drang Valley, and the subsequent airmobile 
strategy which the Army utilized in its search-and-destroy mission during the rest of the war. 
The Howze Tactical Mobility Board 
 During the Cold War, the US Army had not been training to fight an anti-guerilla 
campaign deep in the jungles of South-East Asia, but a conventional, almost rehearsed war 
against the mechanized hordes of Soviet soldiers who were expected to cross from East into 
West Germany at a moment’s notice. Primary evidence of the Army’s Cold War mentality is 
found in the Howze Tactical Mobility Board, as it denotes heavily that the US was still 
preparing to fight a large-scale conventional war in Europe, and not an anti-guerilla 
campaign in Vietnam. The Howze Board, or the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements 
Board: Final Report, records the results of the Army’s months long study into the role of 
Army aviation and aircraft requirements moving into the 1960’s.  The report is written for 24
the highest levels of leadership in the US Army: the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, 
and the Commanding General of US Continental Command, the forebear of the modern day 
Army’s Northern Command.  
 The report has a bias in affirming the validity of the airmobile concept, as the Army 
was actively seeking to acquire airmobile capabilities and bar the US Air Force—which had 
US Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: Final Report, August 20, 24
1962. 
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potential to strip the Army of parts of this role— from acquiring it. Interservice bias is theme 
which pervades military materiel acquisition in the US, which oftentimes can be a struggle 
between services when their roles overlap. The report is largely a document which makes 
acquisition and force restructure recommendations based on what the Army felt was 
necessary moving forward into the Cold War. The report does acknowledge the limitations of 
the role which the helicopter can accept, and calls for a review of Air Force requirements in 
supporting the Army’s ground mission. The report fully supports the airmobile concept, the 
acquisition of millions of dollars worth of helicopters, and the formation and training of two 
airmobile divisions. Eventually, these came to fruition in the form of the 11th Airmobile Test 
Division, and later the 1st Cavalry Division which was reactivated and absorbed most of the 
11th’s resources and personnel.  25
 The Army does acknowledge the possibility of fighting an insurgent force directly in 
the Howze Board Final Report. General Howze found that the US had the possibility of 
fighting four types of hostile forces: a “modern army,” an “oriental” army, insurgents, or 
“other”— a term which the Howze report uses to encompass all other regions that were not 
currently in the US sphere of interest, such as African nations and Latin America.  This 26
finding does not prove that the entire mindset of the Army was geared towards 
counterinsurgency. Indeed, the recommendations in the report were read by select few 
personnel, however it does bring to light that the Big Army had at least considered fighting 
counter insurgency. That being said, the Army decidedly trained and prepared to fight only a 
Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War, 112. 25
US Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, 14. 26
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conventional war moving into Vietnam and there were few resources devoted to counter-
insurgency training. 
 The Board ultimately decided the force-structure of the Army, creating airmobile 
divisions and stationing them across the globe, and made air-mobility the way forward for the 
Army in Vietnam. Horwood’s work draws heavily upon the Board in discussing the 
interservice rivalry that led to the acceptance of the helicopter as its air vehicle of choice. 
Additionally, the Army transferred all of its fixed-wing assets to the Air Force in 1962, the 
same year of the Howze Board Final Report.  This left the helicopter as the only option left 27
for retaining any role providing its own air-support of any kind, and in having any “organic” 
air assets allowed it by the Key West agreement from 1948. Ultimately, the findings of the 
Howe Board have had far reaching effects felt well past the American withdrawal from 
Vietnam, as the helicopter remains the Army’s preferred method of transportation today. 
 Turning Point: The Battle for the Ia Drang Valley 
 By 1965, the 11th Air Assault Test Division had been re-designated as the 1st Air 
Cavalry Division. The reason for this re-designation is simple: the Army prides itself on 
tradition. An Army unit is never truly disbanded, but rather it is “deactivated,” so that in a 
time of war it can be reactivated and its heritage survives. The pre-1965 1st Cavalry Division 
was re-flagged as the 2nd infantry division, and the 1st Cavalry moniker was transferred to 
the 11th Air Assault division, presumably to liken the helicopter and air-mobility to the horse 
and cavalry of the frontier wars.  This is indicative of the Army’s vision for the use of the 28
helicopter, in that it would be used to bare shock troops into battle to overwhelm the enemy 
US Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, 14. 27
Horwood, Interservice Rivalry, 124. 28
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with speed and mobility, as the horse-soldiers of the American Civil War had. This was done 
so that in 1965, the Army had re-branded the air-mobility concept supported by the Howze 
Board, and tested extensively between 1962 and 1965, as an “elite” Army unit, having 
heritage with both the airborne units of WWII, and the heavily romanticized horse soldiers of 
the late 19th century.  
 The helicopter had already proven its capability as a medevac platform during the 
Korean conflict, and air mobility had been tested in peacetime, but it was not until 1965 that 
the 1st Cavalry Division and Air mobility was tested in combat. The Battle for the Ia Drang 
Valley, which occurred in mid-November 1965, was the first large scale confrontation 
between American forces in a strictly combat-role and the NVA.  The 1st Battalion, 7th 
Cavalry Regiment (1/7th) had orders to conduct air-assault operations in order to search out 
and destroy the enemy in the Ia Drang Valley.   The battalion was airlifted by 16 UH-1D 29 30
“Huey” helicopters into landing zones, where they subsequently made contact with the 
enemy and engaged in a firefight that lasted over three days. The resultant battle was a 
victory, in that the battalion managed to kill an estimated 634 enemy soldiers while losing 79 
of their own troops, according the official After-Action-Report (AAR).  However, at the 31
conclusion of the battle the battalion was extracted back to their home base in the vicinity of 
Pleiku, and held none of the territory they had sacrificed 79 men to take hold of and retain 
through heavy enemy fire. This sort of action would characterize much of the military action 
Department of Army, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 1st 29
Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Oral transcript of OPORD given by LTC Moore. 
An After Action Report is conducted following any military exercise, in order to determine what actions went 30
well and should be repeated, and what actions need to be improved. 
Ibid, 17-18.31
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in Vietnam, in that territory—no matter how high the cost paid for it—was abandoned after 
enemy contact had ended.  
 The helicopter lends itself easily to this type of battle, in that it is not designed to sit 
and hold ground, or defend an area. It’s strength lies solely in its agility, in that it is meant to 
land and take-off quickly: it is lightly armored and cannot afford to linger in landing zones. 
This is unlike a tank or armored vehicle, which can withstand direct fire. The helicopter’s 
lack of ground capability influenced the attritional strategy in Vietnam in that it does not lend 
itself to holding to territory as much as, say, a tank.  
 The AAR shows that the helicopter did survive its combat trial, and performed all the 
tasks asked of it. COL Moore, the commander of the 1/7th, praises the men and equipment of 
the 229th Medical Evacuation Battalion who provided air support to the 1/7th during the 
operation. The 229th kept his men resupplied in the field, and the crews were able to land 
under enemy fire to conduct resupply operations. The value of the helicopter was also crucial 
as a direct action platform, providing fire support to soldiers on the ground as evidenced by 
another excerpt from the AAR below.  
Aerial Rocket Artillery is extremely effective especially if the pilots know the 
exact location of the enemy… It has a tremendous shock effect on the enemy. 
The thing about ARA that makes it more effective than artillery is the fact that 
it does not have to be seen by ground observers to be adjusted… Quick 
accurate fire support is the result.”  32
The Battle for the Ia Drang was recognized immediately as having proved the validity of the 
airmobile concept, and was the lessons learned were disseminated across the Army. In a letter 
dated January 7, 1966, COL William Becker—the commandant of the Army Artillery School 
Department of Army, AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 19. 32
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at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, refers to the Battle for the Ia Drang as “a classic battle,” meaning that 
it will be held up as an example of what a textbook air-assault mission looks like.  COL 33
Becker continues to state that “air-mobility was the difference between the brilliant victory 
won, and the probable loss of the initial force had it not been built upon rapidly be air assault 
units.”  The value of the helicopter is without question, based on the language of Colonel’s 34
Moore and Becker.  
 The precedent set by the 1/7th and LTC Moore impacted Army doctrine on air assault 
through the rest of the war. COL Becker’s estimation that the Ia Drang would become a 
“classic” battle proved to be correct: to this day the battle is held up as an example of what an 
air assault should look like. The availability of the helicopter made the air assault strategy 
possible, a fact which is obvious. However, an air-assault is a tactical or operational 
procedure, and does not factor directly into the national foreign-policy level of planning. The 
policy goals of President Johnson, as summarized in his speech from April 7, 1965 and 
analyzed in the previous section, would likely have remained the same irregardless of 
whether the Army had adopted the helicopter or had chosen to rely on air support from the 
Air Force.  
 At the level at which the executive branches of government operate, the military is a 
gargantuan tool which they may apply in an effort to achieve political goals. The concern of 
the executive and policy making should generally not be the specific means and equipment 
which the military uses to achieve its goal, with obvious exceptions to this being weapons of 
COL William Becker to MG Harry Critz on Jan 7, 1965,  in AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 1st Battalion, 33
7th Cavalry. 
Ibid. 34
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mass destruction or other weapons with additional ramifications if they are used. The 
helicopter was not a factor at the broad political level, however it was absolutely vital to the 
Army planners tasked with executing the ground war in South Vietnam. In this, we see the 
difference between political strategy and military strategy. Military planners in Vietnam were 
asked to use the military to achieve political goals, as the military so often is.  
 The Battle for the Ia Drang proved not only the validity of air-mobility, but also 
demonstrated the American reliance on technology to wage wars. COL Moore discusses how 
the quick resupply and the fire support was the only difference between success and failure of 
his mission. His operation, no matter how well planned, relied on the technological 
superiority which his unit held over the NVA forces. It would be a foolish commander who 
would not take advantage of material superiority over the enemy, however technology can be 
relied upon to the point of being a fault. It is a general perception of the Vietnam War—in the 
view of many scholars—that the American military did not have a strategy, besides that of 
attrition and destruction of the enemy. Compared to the NVA and Viet Cong forces—who 
relied on small arms, systems of tunnels and their ability to blend into the population— the 
US forces in Vietnam were cumbersome, slow to react, and reliant on technological 
superiority to decisively win engagements. Reliance on technology proved to influence the 
American strategy of search-and-destroy, as the strategy relied on the helicopter to bring as 
much firepower and personnel to bear against the enemy at any given point. In this way, the 
technology drove and was a deciding factor in the tactical and operational level of strategy 
but not theater/national level, as discussed earlier. 
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Precedence of Strategy 
 Military planners in Vietnam had envisioned the War to unfold like the more recent 
conflicts which the US had fought on the Korean peninsula and in Europe. In these types of 
conflicts, there were large ground campaigns between conventional forces, the enemy wore 
uniforms and behaved somewhat predictably. The unconventional forces which the American 
military were forced to engage for the majority of the Vietnam Conflict created a need for 
American forces to react or alter their doctrinal tactics, techniques and procedures with which 
they had trained. However, the body of scholars who have studied American strategy in the 
War have found that military planners failed to adapt their conventional mindset to 
effectively fight North Vietnamese forces. The helicopter having taken on new roles in the 
Vietnam conflict allowed military commanders to plan their strategy knowing that they had 
the helicopter available. This being the case, it was utilized in the same way that it would 
have been within the context of a more conventional conflict.  
 There is a great deal of scholarly research which has been done to explain the broader 
trends in American military history. This section will highlight the most prominent historians 
who have written on the topic, their theses and how their works are pertinent to Vietnam. I 
will then place my thesis within the conversation which these gentleman have been having 
over the course of the past several decades.  
 Military historian, former Professor of History at Temple University, and lauded 
author Russell Weigley’s American Way of War is a history of American military strategy 
which chronicles the United States military strategy from a general perspective.  The larger 35
Russell F. Weigley,The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New 35
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973). 
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theme of his book is that in its military strategy spanning history, the US has made its 
objective to annihilate enemy forces completely, rather than to seek less total—and therefore 
less costly— victories.   36
 In the early years of America’s involvement in Vietnam, American forces were still 
characterized as being in an advisory role to the South Vietnamese Army. Weigley attributes 
part of the “mission creep”  and increased military activity to the aggressive nature of the 37
American military culture.  Weigley states that throughout America’s history, US forces 38
rarely remained in a defensive posture when more aggressive avenues were available to 
them.  The focus of American strategy shifted early in the War from advising and supporting 39
South Vietnamese forces to denying the enemy freedom of movement and emerging into an 
active combat role. This, in turn, translated into increasing offensive operations in South 
Vietnam, and ultimately shifting the strategy of the War from a limited advisory role to a 
committed war against the enemy.  Weigley’s thesis revolves around the continuing 40
American tradition of total victory, which he defines as complete destruction of enemy 
forces, applied in Vietnam.  The discrepancy between Weigley’s thesis, of American forces 41
seeking total destruction, and the political goals set forth by President Johnson, which was to 
contain the North Vietnamese threat, is clear. The pervasive American mindset being that 
“the best defense is a good offense,” is a common heuristic that has guided American foreign 
Weigley, American Way of War, 463. 36
“Mission creep” is the gradual increase of military activity, which often began as an advisory or supporting 37
role, over a period of time. 
Norman Schwarzkopf, later the Commander of CENTCOM during Desert Storm, was an adviser to South 38
Vietnamese forces during his first tour of duty in Vietnam in 1965 and his later career was heavily influenced by 
his experiences in Vietnam. 
Weigley, The American Way of War, 464. 39
Weigley, The American Way of War, 464.  40
Ibid, 466. 41
!24
policy in the post-WWII era. The helicopter even transformed itself from a utility aircraft in 
Korea to an offensive weapon during Vietnam, as it took on attack and transport roles, 
bringing to fruition the above heuristic.  
 Robert Schulzinger's A Time for War provides a general overview of the US path to 
war.  Schulzinger argues that American technology drove the strategy for the war as much as 42
logic.  He asserts that since the new technology saved American lives, planners also 43
believed it would be effective in other roles; additionally, that the campaign rested on 
America’s ability to out manufacture enemy forces.   Succinctly put, Schulzinger states: “the 44
US fought the war it did because it possessed abundant air power, mobility, technology, and 
firepower.”  Similar to the “logic” which Schulzinger posits governed the strategy in tandem 45
with technology, Palmer argues, in The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War that Robert 
McNamara’s leadership led to quantification of the war, almost akin to keeping score of a 
basketball game except instead of tracking baskets, the score is comprised of casualties.  46
McNamara’s rationalist strategy is an extension, and one of the consequences, of bureaucratic 
“logic” that may make sense from a Washington perspective, but not necessarily to 
servicemen in theater. 
 Dr. Krepenevich’s The Army and Vietnam addresses the doctrinal choices made in 
Vietnam, and the logic employed in reaching those decisions.  Krepenevich poses the idea 47
Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford 42
University Press, 1997). 
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that the US was prepared to fight a large scale, conventional war in Vietnam just as it had in 
Korea, and WWII. These victories affirmed the conventional methods of war in the American 
military’s mindset as being the avenue for success in conflict, and became “deeply embedded 
in the service’s psyche, conventional operations held sway over the Army even as its civilian 
superiors lost faith in their effectiveness,” as Krepenevich phrased it.  48
 The strategy of attrition in Vietnam was the strategy by default, and Krepenevich 
explains the rationale behind it at length, using both reasoning directly from the mouths of 
American generals, as well as historical rationale. The historical rationale, which is more 
directly from the mouth of Krepenevich than the generals, is summarized in the quote below.  
The sheer weight of American materiel and resources seemed sufficient to the 
military leadership to wear down the North Vietnamese and their VC Allies; thus, 
strategy was not necessary. All that was needed was efficient application of 
firepower. It had worked against the Japanese and the Germans in World War II and 
had worked against the Chinese in Korea. It would be tried again in Vietnam.  49
The American forces in WWII and Korea had fought to hold territory, to seize and to defend 
ground. However, American forces in Vietnam rarely held ground once it was captured, 
electing to return to their base. This technique supports Weigley’s thesis that Americans have 
historically fought for complete destruction of enemy forces. In contrast, Krepenevich in the 
quote above fails to take into account the effect that actually holding objectives and terrain 
had on America’s previous conventional wars. There was generous application of military 
materiel in Korea and WWII; the winners of these wars were decided almost as much by the 
domestic manufacturing capabilities of each nation as their military or strategic prowess.  
Ibid, 165. 48
Ibid, 466. 49
!26
 Krepenevich’s thesis, that American military forces rely on overwhelming 
technological superiority to win their wars, is well founded. Tactically, American strategy in 
Vietnam centered around trying to bring about its fire superiority to bear against the enemy. 
Most often, the difficulty was simply in trying to locate, make, and maintain contact with the 
enemy. However, Krepenevich’s excerpt above is a gross oversimplification of American 
strategy, which was more comprehensive. General Westmoreland’s memoir—a summary and 
further analysis of which is in the following section— details his threefold strategy which 
included offensive operations, training ARVN forces, and pacification of the civilian 
population.  However, the offensive search-and-destroy operations are what received most 50
of the public’s attention—as well as the helicopter.  
 An important distinction which I believe that these scholars fail to make is that 
between military and political strategy. Krepenevich, Weigley, and Schulzinger—in broad 
terms—state that the American strategy was reliant on overwhelming firepower. However, 
they discount entirely the civil programs which were a part of the American presence in 
Vietnam.  
 A Soldier Reports: General Westmoreland’s War in Vietnam 
 Perhaps one of the most important primary sources available on the war comes from 
one of its architects, General Westmoreland, in his memoir on the Vietnam War, A Soldier 
Reports. Westmoreland largely blames the results of the war not on his command but rather 
on the American media portrayal of events in the war and the failures of the civilian 
leadership. His writing focused on the internal political struggles he faced in fighting the war: 
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 14. 50
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this is where he believed the war was lost. His memoir is useful for looking at the political 
struggles faced by the Army in Washington. Westmoreland emphatically defends the conduct 
of American service-members throughout his account, at no point placing blame for the 
defeat on them or their actions. All of the blame for the results of the conflict is diverted to 
external sources, however he reserves none of the blame for himself.  
 The bias in General Westmoreland’s work is clear, as his tone often borders on 
defensive. This source provides a high-level, strategic explanation of the ground campaign in 
Vietnam unlike many other sources written by company or field grade officers. The 
perspective of a general officer in understanding the conflict, especially one of the architects 
of the battle strategy, is invaluable to the study of the war as a whole, but particularly useful 
to the search-and-destroy campaign which was waged against the Viet-Cong and North 
Vietnamese Army. Westmoreland, at several points in the book, discusses how the strategy of 
the War might have changed had the political winds shifted. 
The war still could’ve been brought to a favorable end following defeat of the 
enemy’s Tet offensive in 1968… had President Johnson changed our strategy 
and taken advantage of the enemy’s weakness to enable me to carry out 
operations we had planned… doubtless the North Vietnamese would been 
broken.  51
The above excerpt is one example of Westmoreland’s characterization of the war. First of all, 
it is indicative of a prevailing theme of his memoirs that the war was winnable. 
Westmoreland firmly believed that, given more latitude in fighting the war and more control, 
the Army had the resources and ability to fight and win the war.  
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 410. 51
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 Westmoreland pins the blame for Vietnam on several failures. First, he blames the 
political leadership. Their faults lie in the micromanagement of the war, and the lack of 
clarity in their goals for Vietnam. Additionally, he explains that the lack of transparency with 
which President Johnson portrayed the War contributed to the public outcry to end the war. 
This ties heavily into the media portrayal of the war, which lost Westmoreland the support of 
the people. Westmoreland blames the lack of a unified command, as he explains that there 
were essentially five separate “commanders”— CINCPAC, COMUSCAV, and the American 
ambassadors to Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—instead of a single unified command 
who could have successfully operated under broad political guidance.  52
 Westmoreland envisioned a strategy for the war which he called a combined military-
political effort. He had three main goals: clearing out the insurgents in order for the civilian 
agencies to operate, securing the region, and then conducting offensive operations.  53
However, the focus of his efforts were the offensive operations, which he simply calls 
“search-and-destroy,” a term which the media used to characterize the war effort, and which 
was accurate in describing combat operations, but not necessarily the entirety of the efforts.  
 Perhaps the clearest example of strategy driving technology within Westmoreland’s 
memoir is that of the helicopter-gunship. American forces relied on close air-support during 
ground operations, especially during the larger scale engagements which occurred prior to the 
Tet Offensive. Westmoreland explained that it was Washington policy that American fighter-
pilots could only provide air-support with a Vietnamese pilot on board.  He continued to 54
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explain that ground troops believed that “they could count on quicker support from US Army 
helicopters, even though in those days there were no true helicopter gunships.”  During this 55
period, the standard UH-1 “Huey” helicopter was jury-rigged by ground crews with 
additional armaments in order to facilitate the Army’s need for dedicated ground-attack 
aircraft. In this way, the strategy—in this case using helicopters as fire support— led to the 
development of new technology. Dedicated gunships materialized in Vietnam when the 
Cobra attack helicopter came into service in 1969, following the demand for such 
platforms.  56
 I generally agree with Westmoreland’s assessment of the War, in that it was largely 
the political leadership that caused the failure, not the military strategy. The lack of validity 
and reliability of the South Vietnamese government perceived by Westmoreland is also a 
larger factor in the lack of success of the war. Most scholars agreed with the public’s 
reception of the work at the time it was published: Westmoreland shouldered none of the 
responsibility for ramping up the War effort and puts the blame onto the media and 
politicians. There are more recent analysis that has been more favorable towards 
Westmoreland’s command and strategic objectives in Vietnam. 
Conclusion: Technology and Warfare 
 The availability of technology determines the limitations and capabilities of Armies, 
and is a significant factor in determining what strategy to pursue. The Mongol hordes under 
Genghis Khan conquered East Asia utilizing the horse in battle. During WWI, the tank 
enabled the Allies—and the Central Powers—to break the stalemate of trench warfare. In the 
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 86. 55
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modern context, drones allow remotely piloted aircraft to observe battlefields, follow terror 
cells, and launch missiles onto targets on the opposite side of the globe. War is a catalyst to 
technological developments, as the perceived need for new equipment, weapons and 
transportation drives their production and development. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we have 
seen the rapid development of observation drones and an increased reliance on their 
capabilities for intelligence gathering and—later in the conflict—direct strike capabilities. 
Similarly, the helicopter evolved from a utility role into attack and direct action roles as the 
Vietnam war progressed and developed.  
 The helicopter was the US Army’s aircraft of choice for a number of reasons. 
Pragmatically, the vehicle made sense. It was the only aircraft capable of inserting troops 
deep behind enemy lines, replenishing their supply deep within the confines of the jungle, 
and providing dedicated close air support. Bureaucratically, the helicopter allowed the Army 
to retain its own “air force,” stripping several roles—along with funding and authority— 
from its sister service from the US Air Force. 
 The airmobile concept was quickly validated early in the war by the actions of the 1st 
Cavalry Division during the battle for the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 and from then on the 
helicopter was the primary vehicle for troop transport in-country, medical evacuation, and 
became the preferred vehicle for close air support within Army units. From that point 
forward, the Army would continue to pursue the airmobile concept as one of its primary 
efforts towards fighting the North Vietnamese forces. The Ia Drang was a key battle for the 
advancement of air-mobility, as it proved the validity of the helicopter in direct combat roles, 
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and the helicopter continued to provide support the American forces throughout the rest of 
the war. 
 Although the helicopter did not have a direct influence on political strategy and goals 
in the region, it did impact military strategy; which is only a means of executing political 
goals. The war was lost through ambiguous political goals and Cold-War rhetoric. The 
helicopter was integral to the tactical, and operational level combat operations in the fight 
against the NVA and VC forces by facilitating the search-and-destroy operations which the 
US Army primarily pursued in its ground war in South Vietnam. This strategy would come to 
characterize the public perception of the war, and be synonymous with an attrition strategy 
which the media and politicians attributed to General Westmoreland. However, as Greggory 
Daddis points out, Westmoreland’s strategy was more encompassing and included civil-
support operations and an extensive ARVN training mission. The widespread use of and 
reliance on the helicopter by American forces in Vietnam demonstrates the trend in American 
military of over reliance on technology, to the exclusion of sound political strategy.  
 As the US moves forward into new fields of technology, we must be wary of looking 
to new weapons and surveillance equipment for the answer to our foreign policy woes across 
the globe. We cannot “carpet-bomb” or air-assault our way to peace, or stability. The end 
state in Vietnam—stability—was not able to be achieved through force of foreign arms, no 
matter how effective or influential any new piece of technology may be. Technology is 
inherently limited to not only the skill of the end-user, but the government who deploys the 
equipment to achieve its political goals.  
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